(forthcoming)  Cognición Moral . En L. Skidelski, M. Aguilera y S. Barberis, Introducción a las Ciencias Cognitivas

Este artículo está escrito (con María Camila Castro y Santiago Roa) para una colección de ensayos introductorios sobre filosofía de las ciencias cognitivas. Es una revisión (selectiva) de la literatura sobre la psicología del juicio moral

(forthcoming) Negligence: its moral significance. In J. Doris & M. Vargas (eds) Handbook of Moral Psychology. Oxford University Press: New York & Oxford.

This is a draft of my chapter on Negligence for the forthcoming Oxford Handbook in Moral Psychology. It discusses philosophical, psychological, and legal approaches to the attribution of culpability in cases of negligent wrongdoing.

(forthcoming) Forgiveness as emotional distancing. Philosophy and Public Policy . June 2019.

In this paper, I present an account of forgiveness as a process of emotional distancing. The central claim is that, understood in these terms, forgiveness does not require a change in judgment. Rationally forgiving someone, in other words, does not require that one judges the significance of the wrongdoing differently or that one comes to the conclusion that the attitudes behind it have changed in a favorable way. The model shows in what sense forgiving is inherently social, why we should be pluralists about it, and provides a basis for arguing against the existence of necessary conditions of forgiving.

(2018) Review of A. Fairweather & M. Alfano (eds.), Epistemic Situationism, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 08.14.2018.

John Doris and I give a positive review of Epistemic Situationism.

(2018) Two Kinds of Intentions: A new defense of the Simple View. Philosophical Studies 175 (7): 1767-1786.

This paper defends a version of the Simple View, the claim that someone intentionally ϕs only if the person intends to ϕ. To do this, I raise a problem for Bratman’s classic argument (1984, 1987) against it. The problem brings into focus an evaluative dimension behind the View, whose recognition allows for an improved version of it. With this improved version, I then go on to answer other criticisms that have been raised to it.

(2017) Basic Actions Reloaded.  Philosophy Compass 12 (9)

In this article, I examen recent debates concerning the exsitence and nature of basic actions. The discussion is structured around four thesis, wit which Arthurd Dant introduced basic actions to contemporary action theorists. The theses concern i) the relationship between agency and causality, ii) the distinction between basic and complex actions, iii) the regress argument for basic actions and iv) the structure of practical knowledge as illuminated by thesese actions. 

(2016) Slip-Proof Actions. In R. Altschuler y M. Grist (eds) Time and the Philosophy of Action. Routledge: New York & London.

Most human actions are complex, but some of them are basic. Which are these? In this paper, I address this question by invoking slips, a common kind of mistake. The proposal is this: an action is basic if and only if it is not possible to slip in performing it. The argument discusses some well-established results from the psychology of language production in the context of a philosophical theory of action. In the end, the proposed criterion is applied to discuss some well-known theories of basic actions.

(2015) The Argument from Slips. In A. Buckareff, C. Moya & S. Rosell (eds) Agency, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility. Palgrave-Macmillan: New York.

Philosophers of perception are familiar with the argument from illusion, at least since Hume formulated it to challenge a naïve form of realism. In this paper, I present an analogous argument but in the domain of action. It focuses on slips, a common kind of mistake. But, otherwise, it is structurally similar. The argument challenges some contemporary views about the nature of action inspired by Wittgenstein. The discussion shows how thinking about these common mistakes helps illuminate aspects of human agency that tend to be overlooked whenever too much emphasis is placed on the rationality of human actions.

(2014) No Excuses: Performance Mistakes in Morality. In J. Clausen y N. Levy (eds) Springer Handbook of Neuroethics. Dordrecht: Netherlands.

In this paper (co-written with John Doris), we discuss performance mistakes in morality and their implications for theorizing about responsibility. We argue that these mistakes make trouble for conceptions of blame circumscribed by agentic moral qualities and excusability. Such trouble, in turn, motivates a pluralist approach to responsibility.

(2013) Slips. Noûs 47(3): 559-576.

In this paper I introduce slips and argue that this kind of mistake is an exception to the widely held idea that intentional action reveals preference. In particular, the argument is that a slip is an action contrary to a governing intention, which is why it is different from other kinds of mistake: for example, those due to thoughtlessness, temporary forgetfulness, and even irresoluteness (akrasia). In the slip, you behave intentionally. There is no psychological malfunction. But what you do is not what you preferred, given what you believed and desired at the time.